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Because There Was Ample Evidence That Corroborated Barker’s and Bittick’s 
Testimony, The District Court Erroneously Concluded That There Was Insufficient 
Evidence To Sustain Anderson’s Convictions 
 
A. Introduction 
 While accomplice testimony must be corroborated to sustain a conviction, even 
“threadbare” inferential evidence will satisfy the corroboration requirement.  See State v. 
Stone, 147 Idaho 890, 892, 216 P.3d 648, 651 (2009).  Here, the district court found “the 
only evidence linking Anderson to possession of the controlled substances and possession 
of paraphernalia” was the testimony of his accomplices, Barker and Bittick; it further 
concluded there was insufficient corroboration of that testimony.  (R., p. 181.)  This was 
an error, as there was ample corroboration of Barker’s and Bittick’s testimony—the track 
marks on Anderson’s arm, the timing of his admitted relapse, and his own admissions 
that he used drugs while staying with Barker and Bittick. 
 Anderson responds that with respect to the methamphetamine possession charge, 
the state did not preserve its claim that the methamphetamine residue found in the pipe 
could have supported the conviction.  (Respondent’s brief, p. 7, n. 5.)  Further, Anderson 
argues that “the timing of Mr. Anderson’s relapse, the track marks on his arms, and his 
admission to using heroin, do not corroborate” his accomplices’ testimony.  
(Respondent’s brief, pp. 6-11 (capitalization altered).) 
 These arguments fail.  The state did preserve its argument that the pipe residue 
could have supported Anderson’s conviction for methamphetamine possession.  
Moreover, with respect to every count, the jury heard ample evidence that corroborated 
his accomplices’ testimony. 
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B. The State’s Argument That Methamphetamine Residue Could Have Supported 
The Conviction For Possession Of Methamphetamine Is Preserved In The Record 
And Supported On Appeal 
 
 Anderson contends the state’s claim that the methamphetamine residue could have 
supported the methamphetamine possession conviction is not preserved or otherwise 
unsupported on appeal.  (Respondent’s brief, p. 7, n. 5.)  However, a review of the record 
shows the state did preserve the issue of whether methamphetamine residue, found in a 
pipe outside the lockbox, could have substantiated the jury verdict. 
 “The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are 
raised for the first time on appeal.”  Roe v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 580, 
21 P.3d 895, 902 (2001).  In addition, an adverse ruling is a prerequisite to appellate 
review.  Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, Inc., No. 44053, 2017 
WL 2644707, at *6 (Idaho June 20, 2017); Am. Semiconductor., Inc. v. Sage Silicon 
Sols., LLC, 162 Idaho 119, 395 P.3d 338, 353 (2017), reh’g denied (June 8, 2017). 
 The record reveals the state explicitly argued at the Rule 29 motion hearing that 
the methamphetamine pipe residue could have supported the methamphetamine charge: 
But what we aren’t always addressing, there’s essentially two pieces of 
evidence that pertain to the possession of Methamphetamine, and then 
there’s the three pieces of evidence that pertain to the paraphernalia 
charge. 
 
So, I mean, if the baggie of Methamphetamine is thrown out, we still have 
the pipe for the charge of Methamphetamine. However, if the heroin 
charge is dismissed, of course there’s no alternative object or evidence in 
relation to the heroin charge. 
 
(Tr., p. 152, Ls. 4-13 (emphasis added).)  Based on this there could be no confusion that 
the state’s position was: 1) the baggie of methamphetamine in the lockbox was not the 
only evidence that could have supported a methamphetamine charge; and 2) that 
 3 
assuming, arguendo, there was insufficient evidence that Anderson possessed the baggie, 
the state would “still have the pipe for the charge of methamphetamine.”  (Tr., p. 152, 
Ls. 4-13; see also R., pp. 169-70 (arguing the officer’s “discovery of the glass pipe, later 
confirmed to contain methamphetamine … corroborates Barker’s testimony that it was 
Defendant’s and he placed it there”).)  When the district court affirmed Anderson’s Rule 
29 motion, it was therefore, by necessity, ruling against this theory and preserving it for 
appeal.  
 Moreover, the state plainly renewed this argument on appeal: 
The state also contends that even assuming, arguendo, there was 
insufficient evidence to support a conviction for possession of the heroin 
found within the lockbox, there was nevertheless ample evidence to 
support a conviction possession of the methamphetamine found outside the 
lockbox, as explained herein. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8, n. 4 (emphasis added).)  In explaining why the court was wrong 
to dismiss the methamphetamine charge based on lockbox-items only (see Appellant’s 
brief, p. 15), the state’s briefing restated this argument in the clearest possible terms: 
As alluded to below, the state concedes on appeal that there was 
insufficient evidence to show that Anderson—or for that matter anyone 
other than Barker’s imprisoned boyfriend—could access the heroin found 
in the lockbox.  (See Tr., p. 152, Ls. 9-13.)  However, as argued below 
and herein, this has no bearing on the methamphetamine pipe found 
outside the lockbox, which ample evidence shows Anderson possessed. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 15, n. 5 (emphasis added).)  This argument was therefore made 
below, restated on appeal, and is plainly preserved for appellate review. 
 Anderson claims this argument has not been preserved or is unsupported for three 
reasons: 1)  “[f]irst, the State failed to provide this Court with a transcript of either its 
opening or closing arguments; thus, the State failed to provide an adequate record 
-----
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showing the jury’s verdict may have been based on this theory”; 2) “in arguing against 
Mr. Anderson’s Rule 29 motion, the prosecuting attorney did not argue the residue found 
in the pipe was sufficient to support the guilty verdict on the possession of the 
methamphetamine charge”; and 3) “the State fails to support such a claim (if it is raising 
such a claim) with argument and authority.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 7, n. 5.) 
 These arguments fail.  As for Anderson’s first challenge, he applies the wrong 
legal standard by asking whether the record shows the state articulated a particular theory 
of the case in its opening and closing arguments.  Arguments are not evidence.  See State 
v. Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 56, 539 P.2d 604, 608 (1975); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 
156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007).  Moreover, a review of a Rule 29 motion simply asks 
“whether there was substantial evidence upon which a trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 
679, 684, 99 P.3d 1069, 1074 (2004) (emphasis added).   
Turning to the elements here, Anderson was not charged with “possession of 
methamphetamine in a lockbox,” or “possession of non-residue methamphetamine.”  He 
was charged with possession of methamphetamine.  (R., p. 60.)  And there was ample 
evidence, based on the pipe alone, from which the jury could have found the elements of 
that crime: the jury heard that Anderson smoked methamphetamine with a glass pipe  
(Tr., p. 69, L. 15 – p. 70, L. 5); that the pipe was used by Anderson on or about February 
17 to smoke methamphetamine (see Tr., p. 35, L. 24 – p. 36, L. 10); that Anderson 
personally picked up the pipe and put it in the bedroom (Tr., p. 37, 16-23; p. 41, L. 24 – 
p. 43, 8); that the pipe was found in the bedroom closet and recognizable as specifically 
Anderson’s (Tr., p. 44, L. 22 – p. 45, L. 7; p. 69, L. 15 – p. 70, L. 5; p. 103, Ls. 1-3); that 
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it appeared to an officer to be a methamphetamine pipe  (Tr., p. 92, L. 23 – p. 93, L. 2); 
and that it contained residue that later tested positive for methamphetamine (Tr., p. 143, 
L. 25 – p. 144, L. 19; State’s Ex. 5).  Accordingly, whether the state sufficiently 
articulated the significance of the pipe in non-evidentiary argument misses the point.  The 
record plainly shows the jury heard abundant evidence, pertaining to the pipe alone, from 
which it could have found the elements of the charge. 
 Anderson’s preservation argument is likewise misplaced, because it fails to 
acknowledge that the state specifically argued below that the pipe could have sustained 
the methamphetamine charge.  Anderson contends the state did not make this argument 
but a review of the record shows that it did.  (Compare Respondent’s brief, p. 7, n. 5 with 
Tr., p. 152, Ls. 4-13.) 
Lastly, Anderson makes the generalized charge that the state “fail[ed] to support” 
the methamphetamine pipe claim “with argument and authority in its Appellant’s Brief.”  
(Respondent’s brief, p. 7, n. 5.)  However, the state not only restated the theory 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8, n. 4; p. 15, n. 5) and the facts that supported it on appeal 
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 1-3), but discussed at length the heart of the issue: how Anderson’s 
testimony sufficiently corroborated the accomplice testimony, which included the 
testimony that he had methamphetamine (see Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16 (“Given the 
logic of Stone, one can readily and reasonably infer from Anderson’s heroin admissions 
that he also used methamphetamine.”)). 
 The claim that the jury could have convicted Anderson of methamphetamine 
possession based on the methamphetamine pipe was plainly presented below, and restated 
and supported on appeal.  That claim is therefore preserved for review. 
----
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C. The Timing Of Anderson’s Relapse, The Track Marks On His Arm, And 
Anderson’s Own Statements About His Drug Use While In Barker’s House 
Corroborated Barker’s And Bittick’s Testimony 
 
A conviction cannot be based “on the testimony of an accomplice” unless the 
testimony “is corroborated by other evidence, which in itself, and without the aid of the 
testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the 
offense.”  I.C. § 19-2117.  But the requisite “corroborating evidence may be slight, need 
only go to one material fact and may be entirely circumstantial.”  State v. Campbell, 
114 Idaho 367, 370, 757 P.2d 230, 232 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Evans, 102 Idaho 461, 
463, 631 P.2d 1220, 1222 (1981); State v. Brown, 53 Idaho 576, 581, 26 P.2d 131, 133 
(1933).  In fact, even “threadbare,” inferential evidence will satisfy the corroboration 
requirement.  See Stone, 147 Idaho at 892, 216 P.3d at 651.  The Stone Court considered 
whether slight and purely inferential evidence would be sufficient to corroborate the 
accomplice testimony: 
We agree with the district court’s characterization of both the strength and 
sufficiency of the corroborative evidence. As noted, corroborative 
testimony may be “slight” and need only “tend” to connect the defendant 
to the crime. Stone’s unsolicited knowledge of the names of the 
individuals involved, and the motive for the crime, could reasonably be 
inferred to indicate more involvement than a passive recipient of news. 
Even a highly plausible innocent explanation of the evidence “does not 
strip the evidence of its corroborative character.” Moreover, one is entitled 
to reasonably question why Stone would initially claim not to be in 
Blackfoot and then change his story if he had no connection at all to the 
incident. 
 
Id. at 893, 216 P.3d at 651.  The Stone Court accordingly found that “[s]ufficient 
corroborative evidence was presented at trial to sustain the verdicts,” and affirmed.  Id. 
 Anderson argues that the state did not present sufficient evidence corroborating 
the testimony of his accomplices.  (Respondent’s brief, pp. 6-11.)  Specifically, Anderson 
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argues that the heroin found in the house was inaccessible, and by necessity could not 
have been possessed by him.  (Respondent’s brief, p. 8.)  Moreover, he argues that the 
timing of his relapse, the track marks on his arms, and his admissions of heroin use would 
only corroborate testimony about a possession of heroin charge—not possession of 
methamphetamine.  (Respondent’s brief, pp. 8-11.)  Anderson, like the district court 
before him, therefore concludes that the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated, and 
insufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict.  (Respondent’s brief, pp. 6-11.) 
 But Anderson errs by applying a far-too stringent test for corroboration, and in 
doing so, contradicts the applicable case law.  Anderson’s essential point is that 
corroborating statements about using heroin can only be used to corroborate a charge of 
heroin possession, and not methamphetamine.  (See Respondent’s brief, pp. 8-9, 11.)  
This is an error. 
As set forth in the Stone case, even evidence of innocent acts can be used to 
corroborate the entirety of an accomplices’ testimony concerning altogether different 
illegal acts.  See 147 Idaho at 892-93, 216 P.3d at 650-51.  This is because courts can 
infer that testimony is true even if the corroborating evidence only goes to one material 
fact, and does not corroborate every detail of the charged acts.  See id.  Stone exemplified 
this rule; there the only corroborating evidence was the defendant’s knowledge of the 
accomplices’ names and the fact that he changed his story.  Id. 
 Critically, the Stone Court did not hold that evidence directly pertaining to a 
robbery was the only thing that could corroborate a robbery charge.  See id.  Nor did the 
Court hold knowledge of names could only corroborate news consumption habits, or that 
evidence of a changed story could only corroborate faulty memory.  See id.  Instead, the 
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Court corroborated his accomplices’ robbery testimony based solely on inferences drawn 
from Stone’s non-robbery admissions, and concluded there was sufficient evidence to 
uphold the jury verdict.  Id. at 893, 216 P.3d at 651 (“Stone’s unsolicited knowledge of 
the names of the individuals involved, and the motive for the crime, could reasonably be 
inferred to indicate more involvement than a passive recipient of news.… Moreover, one 
is entitled to reasonably question why Stone would initially claim not to be in Blackfoot 
and then change his story if he had no connection at all to the incident.”). 
 Applying that standard here quickly resolves this case.  Barker and Bittick 
testified that Anderson used heroin and methamphetamine, at Barker’s house, on or about 
February 17.  (Tr., p. 33, Ls. 6-19; p. 47, Ls. 11-13; p. 67, L. 4 – p. 68, L. 7.)  Anderson 
likewise admitted to using heroin with Barker and Bittick, at Barker’s house, on or about 
February 17, and he had track marks reflecting intravenous drug use.  (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 9-
15; p. 20, L. 18 – p. 21, L. 1; p. 25, L. 25 – p. 26, L. 20; p. 27, Ls. 18-25.)  Applying the 
rule from Stone one can readily infer that Anderson’s statements corroborated Barker’s 
and Bittick’s testimony, as it verifies multiple material details and mirrors their testimony 
in nearly every respect.  See 147 Idaho at 891-92, 216 P.3d at 649-50.  The fact that 
Anderson did not specifically confirm that he was smoking methamphetamine is 
inconsequential.  If Stone stands for anything, it is that the entirety of an accomplice’s 
testimony can be corroborated based on inferences drawn from the defendant’s 
statements.  Here, inferring that Anderson used both of the drugs his accomplices said he 
did, based on his own admission to using one of the drugs, is a common-sense inference, 
and straightforward application of the rule in Stone. 
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 Anderson leaves Stone unturned on appeal, citing it in passing, but declining to 
address the state’s argument that it resolves this case.  (See Respondent’s brief, pp. 8-9.)  
In particular, Anderson does not explain how his theory of the case—that heroin 
admissions can only corroborate heroin charges—explains the result in Stone, where the 
defendant’s statements were not about robberies, but nevertheless corroborated the 
testimony that he was a robbery getaway driver.  See 147 Idaho at 891-92, 216 P.3d at 
649-50. 
Because the district court erroneously found that Barker’s and Bittick’s testimony 
was not corroborated, it incorrectly concluded the evidence was insufficient to sustain 
Anderson’s convictions for possession of heroin, methamphetamine, and paraphernalia.  
Construing the facts and inferences in favor of upholding the jury’s verdict, the jury 
correctly found that the evidence supported a guilty verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court reverse the order of the district court and 
remand for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 26th day of September, 2017. 
 
       
 _/s/ Kale D. Gans___________ 
 KALE D. GANS 
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